Testing Random-Detector-Efficiency Countermeasure in a Commercial System Reveals a Breakable Unrealistic Assumption
Authors:
- 19 September 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics
- Vol. 52 (11) , 1-11
Abstract
In the last decade, efforts have been made to reconcile theoretical security with realistic imperfect implementations of quantum key distribution. Implementable countermeasures are proposed to patch the discovered loopholes. However, certain countermeasures are not as robust as would be expected. In this paper, we present a concrete example of ID Quantique's random-detector-efficiency countermeasure against detector blinding attacks. As a third-party tester, we have found that the first industrial implementation of this countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack, but not immune to a modified blinding attack. Then, we implement and test a later full version of this countermeasure containing a security proof. We find that it is still vulnerable against the modified blinding attack, because an assumption about hardware characteristics on which the proof relies fails in practice.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Industry Canada
- NSERC under the Discovery and CryptoWorks21 Programs
- CFI
- Ontario MRI
- U.S. Office of Naval Research
- ID Quantique
- European Commission’s FET QICT SIQS
- EMPIR 14IND05 MIQC2 Projects
- Thai DPST Scholarship
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