Conditioning Prices on Purchase History
Authors:
- Alessandro AcquistiAAAlessandro Acquisti
- Hal R. VarianHVHal R. Varian
Preprint
- 1 January 2002
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Many transactions are now computer mediated, making it possible for sellers to condition their pricing on the history of interactions with individual consumers.Keywords
All Related Versions
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