Oligopsony Power, Asset Specificity, and Hold‐Up: Evidence from the Broiler Industry
Authors:
- 1 August 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 88 (3) , 589-605
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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