On the optimality of resetting executive stock options
Authors:
- Viral V. AcharyaVAViral V. Acharya
- Kose JohnKJKose John
- Rangarajan K. SundaramRSRangarajan K. Sundaram
- 1 July 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 65-101
Abstract
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This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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