Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment
Author:
- 1 September 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 7 (1) , 72-99
Abstract
(1997). Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment. Security Studies: Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 72-99.Keywords
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