The unintended composition effect of the subnational government fiscal rules: The case of Italian municipalities
Author:
- Fiorenza VenturiniFVFiorenza Venturini
- 1 June 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 63
Abstract
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