The base rate principle and the fairness principle in social judgment
Authors:
- 20 June 2016
- journal article
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 113 (27) , 7475-7480
Abstract
Significance: In the absence of individuating facts, beliefs about individuals can either use base rates to maximize statistical likelihood or uphold fairness to maximize equal opportunity. But once individuating facts become known, neither base rates nor fairness should drive beliefs. Only the facts should matter. Whereas explicit beliefs rationally follow this prescription, implicit beliefs do not. Despite learning individuating facts about a particular male and female that rendered base rates inapplicable, implicit beliefs still relied on base rates. These findings are important not just for theories of social cognition and Bayesian updating, but also for crafting policies that will minimize the undesired impact of stereotypes on decisions about the worth and capabilities of specific individuals.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (DGE 1144152)
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