Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China
Authors:
- Agnes W.Y. LoALAgnes W.Y. Lo
- Raymond M.K. WongRWRaymond M.K. Wong
- Michael FirthMFMichael Firth
Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2010
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 16 (2) , 225-235
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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