Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited
Authors:
- Jacek LewkowiczJLJacek Lewkowicz
- Rafał WoźniakRWRafał Woźniak
- Michał WoźniakMWMichał Woźniak
- Michał WrzesińskiMWMichał Wrzesiński
- 1 January 2025
- book chapter
- Published by University of Warsaw
Abstract
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