Optimal data attacks on power grids: Leveraging detection & measurement jamming
Authors:
- 1 November 2015
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 392-397
Abstract
Meter measurements in the power grid are susceptible to manipulation by adversaries that can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a general framework to study attacks on state estimation by adversaries capable of injecting bad-data into measurements and further, of jamming their reception. Through these two techniques, a novel `detectable jamming' attack is designed that changes the state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. Compared to commonly studied `hidden' data attacks, these attacks have lower costs and a wider feasible operating region. It is shown that the entire domain of jamming costs can be divided into two regions, with distinct graph-cut based formulations for the design of the optimal attack. The most significant insight arising from this result is that the adversarial capability to jam measurements changes the optimal `detectable jamming' attack design only if the jamming cost is less than half the cost of bad-data injection. A polynomial time approximate algorithm for attack vector construction is developed and its efficacy in attack design is demonstrated through simulations on IEEE test systems.Keywords
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