Competition Among Sellers in Online Exchanges
- 1 March 2005
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 16 (1) , 47-60
Abstract
With the advent of the Internet, and the minimal information technology requirements of a trading partner to join an exchange, the number of sellers who can qualify and participate in online exchanges is greatly increased. We model the competition between two sellers with different unit costs and production capacities responding to a buyer demand. The resulting mixed-strategy equilibrium shows that one of the sellers has a normal high price with random sales, while the other seller continuously randomizes its prices. It also brings out the inherent advantages that sellers with lower marginal costs or higher capacities have in joining these exchanges, and provides a theoretical basis for understanding the relative advantages of various types of sellers in such exchanges.Keywords
This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
- Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information: A Game‐Theoretic Model*Decision Sciences, 2003
- Information Transparency in Electronic Marketplaces: Why Data Transparency May Hinder the Adoption of B2B ExchangesElectronic Markets, 2002
- Evolution of B2B MarketplacesElectronic Markets, 2002
- Reinforcement-based adaptive learning in asymmetric two-person bargaining with incomplete informationExperimental Economics, 1998
- Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetryEconomic Theory, 1996
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate termGames and Economic Behavior, 1995
- Middlemen as ExpertsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- MiddlemenThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987
- Financial intermediary-coalitionsJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
- Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot OutcomesThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983