Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment
Open Access
- 1 May 2011
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 133-159
Abstract
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 29 references indexed in Scilit:
- Promises and PartnershipEconometrica, 2006
- Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois AgricultureAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 2000
- Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hiddenInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 2000
- Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese ManagersAmerican Economic Review, 1999
- When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor MarketsJournal of Labor Economics, 1998
- Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance MarketJournal of Political Economy, 1994
- Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car MarketJournal of Political Economy, 1993
- ADVERTISING AND PRODUCT QUALITY IN POSTED‐OFFER EXPERIMENTSEconomic Inquiry, 1990
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970