Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring
Open Access
- 24 January 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 339-362
Abstract
We evaluate the value of loan monitoring systems for a bank controlled by a micro-prudential regulator. We investigate dynamic systems (an information channel that generates information flow about quality) and static systems (where the lender receives a single signal about loan quality). We find that dynamic systems carry a regulatory charge that dominates the benefit of the systems and are therefore unprofitable, whereas static systems have positive value. Specifically, lenders can profitably dismantle their dynamic systems and instead turn to static monitoring systems. The model reveals, therefore, a potential weakness of micro-prudential regulation.Keywords
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