Putting social preferences to work: Can revealed preferences predict real effort provision?
Author:
- Joshua FosterJFJoshua Foster
- 1 December 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 45, 128-140
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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