Ex Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions
Authors:
- 1 March 2010
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
- Vol. 21 (1) , 133-153
Abstract
Keyword advertising, including sponsored links and contextual advertising, powers many of today's online information services such as search engines and Internet-based emails. This paper examines the design of keyword auctions, a novel mechanism that keyword advertising providers such as Google and Yahoo! use to allocate advertising slots. In our keyword auction model, advertisers bid their willingness-to-pay per click on their advertisements, and the advertising provider can weight advertisers' bids differently and require different minimum bids based on advertisers' click-generating potential. We study the impact and design of such weighting schemes and minimum-bid policies. We find that weighting scheme determines how advertisers with different click-generating potential match in equilibrium. Minimum bids exclude low-valuation advertisers and at the same time may distort the equilibrium matching. The efficient design of keyword auctions requires weighting advertisers' bids by their expected click-through-rates, and requires the same minimum weighted bids. The revenue-maximizing weighting scheme may or may not favor advertisers with low click-generating potential. The revenue-maximizing minimum-bid policy differs from those prescribed in the standard auction design literature. Keyword auctions that employ the revenue-maximizing weighting scheme and differentiated minimum bid policy can generate higher revenue than standard fixed-payment auctions. We draw managerial implications for pay-per-click and other pay-for-performance auctions and discuss potential applications to other areas.Keywords
This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
- Properties of scoring auctionsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2008
- Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of KeywordsAmerican Economic Review, 2007
- Designing online auctions with past performance informationDecision Support Systems, 2006
- An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search2006
- Pricing and Resource Allocation in Caching Services with Multiple Levels of Quality of ServiceManagement Science, 2005
- Pricing and Allocation for Quality-Differentiated Online ServicesManagement Science, 2005
- Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price ContractsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2003
- Optimal Multi-Object AuctionsReview of Economic Studies, 2000
- Design Competition Through Multidimensional AuctionsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent AnalysisThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1986