Mechanism design for first-mile ridesharing based on personalized requirements part II: Solution algorithm for large-scale problems
Authors:
- Zheyong BianZBZheyong Bian
- Xiang LiuXLXiang Liu
- 1 February 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
- Vol. 120, 172-192
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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