United Kingdom: Selected Issues
Author:
- International Monetary FundIFInternational Monetary Fund
- 1 January 1999
- journal article
- Published by International Monetary Fund (IMF) in IMF Staff Country Reports
- Vol. 99 (44)
Abstract
This Selected Issues paper examines the operational independence and the conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom. The paper describes the inflation targeting framework and the analytics of the decision-making process. It suggests that inflation targeting, although not entirely new in terms of the basic idea, is a rather significant step toward establishing a workable and well-defined framework for monetary policy. The paper also describes structure, mandate, and policy issues associated with the financial services authority.Keywords
All Related Versions
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