Securing unsafe rust programs with XRust
Authors:
Open Access
- 27 June 2020
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 234-245
Abstract
Rust is a promising systems programming language that embraces both high-level memory safety and low-level resource manipulation. However, the dark side of Rust, unsafe Rust, leaves a large security hole as it bypasses the Rust type system in order to support low-level operations. Recently, several real-world memory corruption vulnerabilities have been discovered in Rust's standard libraries. We present XRust, a new technique that mitigates the security threat of unsafe Rust by ensuring the integrity of data flow from unsafe Rust code to safe Rust code. The cornerstone of XRust is a novel heap allocator that isolates the memory of unsafe Rust from that accessed only in safe Rust, and prevents any cross-region memory corruption. Our design of XRust supports both single-and multi-threaded Rust programs. Our extensive experiments on real-world Rust applications and standard libraries show that XRust is both highly efficient and effective in practice.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Shreds: Fine-Grained Execution Units with Private Memory2016
- SVF: interprocedural static value-flow analysis in LLVM2016
- Crust: A Bounded Verifier for Rust (N)2015
- The Matter of Heartbleed2014
- Codejail: Application-Transparent Isolation of Libraries with Tight Program Interactions2012
- JVM-Portable Sandboxing of Java’s Native Libraries2012
- SoftBoundACM SIGPLAN Notices, 2009
- Control-flow integrity2005
- Beyond stack smashing: recent advances in exploiting buffer overrunsIEEE Security & Privacy, 2004
- CCured2002