Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors
Authors:
- Vicente CuñatVCVicente Cuñat
- Maria GuadalupeMGMaria Guadalupe
- 1 March 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 33 (3) , 495-504
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
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