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Publications
The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments
Home
Publications
The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments
The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments
Author:
GM
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
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1 November 1995
journal article
Published by
Oxford University Press (OUP)
in
The Economic Journal
Vol. 105
(433)
,
1381-1402
DOI:
10.2307/2235106
Abstract
In order to increase their electoral chances, incumbents may forego policy measures that improve the relative standing of their opponents in the eyes
Keywords
ELECTORAL
REFRAIN
ILLUSTRATES
ECONOMY
INCUMBENTS
ELECTION
DISADVANTAGE
STANDING
OPPOSITE
INFLATION
All Related Versions
Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
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