Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Author:
- David ChristensenDCDavid Christensen
- 1 September 2001
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 68 (3) , 356-376
Abstract
Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case preference-defects serve as a diagnostic tool, indicating purely epistemic defects.Keywords
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