Local cyber-physical attack with leveraging detection in smart grid
Authors:
- 1 October 2017
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 461-466
Abstract
A well-designed attack in the power system can cause an initial failure and then results in large-scale cascade failure. Several works have discussed power system attack through false data injection, line-maintaining attack, and line-removing attack. However, the existing methods need to continuously attack the system for a long time, and, unfortunately, the performance cannot be guaranteed if the system states vary. To overcome this issue, we consider a new type of attack strategy called combinational attack which masks a line-outage at one position but misleads the control center on line outage at another position. Therefore, the topology information in the control center is interfered by our attack. We also offer a procedure of selecting the vulnerable lines of its kind. The proposed method can effectively and continuously deceive the control center in identifying the actual position of line-outage. The system under attack will be exposed to increasing risks as the attack continuously. Simulation results validate the efficiency of the proposed attack strategy.Keywords
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