Tax avoidance, managerial ownership, and agency conflicts
Authors:
- Nopparat WongsinhirunNWNopparat Wongsinhirun
- Pattanaporn ChatjuthamardPCPattanaporn Chatjuthamard
- Pandej ChintrakarnPCPandej Chintrakarn
- Pornsit JirapornPornsit Jiraporn
- 29 December 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 61
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Chulalongkorn University
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