Learning, reputation and entry deterrence: A chain-store game with correlated entrants
Author:
- 1 July 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 14 (5) , 561-573
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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