EPISTEMIC ACTION, EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE, AND METACOGNITION
Author:
- 23 September 2014
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophical Issues
- Vol. 24 (1) , 364-392
Abstract
How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of the agent, as a result of a process of enculturation. We argue that this view does not capture the role of sensitivity to epistemic norms in forming true beliefs. An analysis of epistemic actions, basic and extended, is proposed as offering an appropriate framework for crediting an agent with knowledge.Keywords
Funding Information
- European Research Council (269616)
This publication has 47 references indexed in Scilit:
- Metacognition: computation, biology and functionPhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2012
- Chapitre 9. Cognitive enhancement, human evolution and bioethicsJournal international de bioéthique et d'éthique des sciences, 2011
- Metacognition and mindreading: Judgments of learning for Self and Other during self-paced studyConsciousness and Cognition, 2010
- XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist ViewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2008
- Attacking the Bounds of CognitionPhilosophical Psychology, 2006
- Reflective Knowledge in the Best CirclesThe Journal of Philosophy, 1997
- Intuitive and Reflective BeliefsMind & Language, 1997
- Intuitive and Reflective BeliefsMind & Language, 1997
- On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic ActionCognitive Science, 1994
- Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.Psychological Review, 1991