The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages
Authors:
- Peter CramtonPCPeter Cramton
- Morley GundersonMGMorley Gunderson
- Joseph TracyJTJoseph Tracy
- 1 August 1999
- journal article
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 81 (3) , 475-487
Abstract
Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January, 1967, to March, 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions. © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyKeywords
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