Decentralization and Collusion
Authors:
- Sandeep BaligaSBSandeep Baliga
- Tomas SjöströmTSTomas Sjöström
- 1 December 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 83 (2) , 196-232
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
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