Waiting to Persuade
Author:
- 1 February 2004
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 119 (1) , 223-248
Abstract
I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers),Keywords
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