Side Channels in Deduplication
Open Access
- 2 April 2017
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 266-274
Abstract
Deduplication removes redundant copies of files or data blocks stored on the cloud. Client-side deduplication, where the client only uploads the file upon the request of the server, provides major storage and bandwidth savings, but introduces a number of security concerns. Harnik et al. (2010) showed how cross-user client-side deduplication inherently gives the adversary access to a (noisy) side-channel that may divulge whether or not a particular file is stored on the server, leading to leakage of user information. We provide formal definitions for deduplication strategies and their security in terms of adversarial advantage. Using these definitions, we provide a criterion for designing good strategies and then prove a bound characterizing the necessary trade-off between security and efficiency.Keywords
Funding Information
- Norges Forskningsråd (248166)
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