Rational Expectations or Heuristics?
Author:
- 1 January 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 14 (1) , 31-49
Abstract
The process of formation of electoral expectations in proportional representation systems is analysed in this article. Contrary to Duvergerian or electoral coordination theories, by using survey and in-depth elite interview data from Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, it is shown that strategic voting depends on heuristics (i.e. extrapolations from the previous election) rather than on rational expectations. The main implication is that strategic voting is possible in large districts.Keywords
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