Mechanism Design for an Incentive Subsidy Scheme for Bus Transport
Open Access
- 22 March 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 11 (6) , 1740
Abstract
Large public transport subsidies necessitated by operating deficits have become a heavy financial burden on some local governments. However, the present subsidy scheme lacks incentives to encourage bus operators to reduce deficits to lessen subsidies. In order to motivate bus operators to exert their roles in reducing these subsidies to ensure sustainable finance, this paper designs an incentive subsidy scheme based on the Laffont–Tirole model. This scheme is designed to motivate bus operators to endeavor to reduce deficits so as to obtain a premium, thus minimizing the total amount of subsidies and maximizing social benefit. The case of the bus network in Kumamoto, Japan, shows how, with this subsidy scheme, bus operators can play roles in lessening subsidies, allowing a win-win situation for both bus operators and the local government, and maximizing social benefit to realize the sustainability of the city. Finally, findings of our sensitivity analysis with imperfect information suggest that the length of bus lines in a network should be shortened in order to avoid cost waste to lessen subsidies.Keywords
Funding Information
- Basic Business Fees of Central Universities (3122015C002)
- Civil Aviation University of China Foundation Project (2014QD07S)
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
- Contracting regimes for bus services: What have we learnt after 20 years?Research in Transportation Economics, 2010
- The effect of governmental subsidies and the contractual model on the publicly-owned bus sector in JapanResearch in Transportation Economics, 2010
- Farmers’ Willingness to Pay for Irrigation Water: A Case of Tank Irrigation Systems in South IndiaWater, 2009
- Performance-based quality contracts for the bus sector: delivering social and commercial value for moneyTransportation Research Part B: Methodological, 2004
- Performance-based quality contracts in bus service provisionTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 2003
- Laffont and Tirole's Competition in Telecommunications : A View From the USInternational Journal of the Economics of Business, 2002
- Political Culture, Economic Structure and Policy: The Laffont‐Tirole Model Extended to Modern JapanThe American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2002
- Incentive Regulatory Policies: The Case of Public Transit Systems in FranceThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2002
- Operating subsidies and performance in public transit: an empirical studyTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 1998
- Cost and performance impacts of transit subsidy programsTransportation Research Part A: General, 1984