Interpersonal comparisons of well-being: Increasing convergence
Author:
Open Access
- 26 February 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics, Philosophy & Economics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 321-345
Abstract
The main question of this paper is how people may agree in their interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing. These comparisons are important in social ethics and for policy purposes. The paper firstly examines grounds for convergence in easy cases. Then comes a more difficult case of low convergence in order to explore a way to increase it. For this, concepts from the empirical subjective well-being literature are used: life satisfaction and vignettes. Ideas of John Harsanyi and Serge Kolm thereby receive a new look.Keywords
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