We examine how the 1997 Treu labor reform in Italy, an externally timed institutional change, expanded firms’ scope to differentiate employment and compensation arrangements. Using more than two million matched employer-employee-year observations, we document that within-firm pay dispersion increased after the reform, with compensation rising at the top of the within-firm pay distribution and declining at the bottom. Greater post-reform pay dispersion is associated with higher workforce productivity and stronger operating performance, as well as greater workforce stability, reflected in lower employment volatility and employee turnover, higher retention, and lower separation rates. We further find that left-leaning and pro-labor sentiment attenuates both the post-reform increase in pay dispersion and the positive associations of pay dispersion with productivity, retention, and operating performance. Finally, although the reform reduced the overall share of permanent contracts, greater post-reform pay dispersion is associated with a higher share of permanent contracts, particularly among lower-paid workers. Taken together, the findings suggest that within-firm pay dispersion is not merely a wage-allocation outcome but part of a broader workforce-management and organizational-control configuration. Its organizational consequences depend on the employment practices with which pay differentiation is combined and on the institutional environment in which firms operate.