Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives and Job Design*
Open Access
- 1 July 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (2) , 299-316
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Power in the Firm and Managerial Career ConcernsJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2003
- The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and IncentivesJournal of Political Economy, 2002
- Career Concerns in TeamsJournal of Labor Economics, 2002
- Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive ContractsThe Journal of Human Resources, 2002
- Discretion and Incentives in OrganizationsJournal of Labor Economics, 2000
- What Trade-off of Risk and Incentives?American Economic Review, 2000
- Performance Comparisons and Dynamic IncentivesJournal of Political Economy, 1997
- Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and EvidenceJournal of Political Economy, 1992
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent SituationsEconometrica, 1991
- Agency Problems and the Theory of the FirmJournal of Political Economy, 1980