Types of understanding: Their nature and their relation to knowledge
- 28 January 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Conceptus
- Vol. 40 (98) , 67-88
Abstract
What does it mean to understand something? I approach this question by comparing understanding with knowledge. Like knowledge, understanding comes, at least prima facia, in three varieties: propositional, interrogative and objectual. I argue that explanatory understanding (this being the most important form of interrogative understanding) and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and are neither identical with, nor even a form of, the corresponding type of knowledge (nor any other type of knowledge). My discussion suggests that definitions of the concepts of explanatory and of objectual understanding must include a commitment condition, a grasping condition, an answering-the-facts condition, and an epistemically internal justification condition, but no further external anti-luck condition. On this basis I argue against reducing explanatory understanding to propositional understanding, and in favour of identifying propositional understanding with propositional knowledge.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
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- The Value of Scientific UnderstandingPhilosophica, 1993