The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management
Authors:
- Tor-Erik BakkeTBTor-Erik Bakke
- Hamed MahmudiHMHamed Mahmudi
- Chitru S. FernandoCFChitru S. Fernando
- Jesus M. SalasJSJesus M. Salas
- 1 June 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 120 (3) , 623-643
Abstract
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