Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China
Authors:
- Yanchun PanYPYanchun Pan
- Wen YangWYWen Yang
- Nan MaNMNan Ma
- Zhimin ChenZCZhimin Chen
- Ming ZhouMZMing Zhou
- Yi XiongYXYi Xiong
- 1 July 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 130, 418-428
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71472126, 71402102, 71572114, 71402101, 71272089)
- Young Teacher Cultivation Projects in Guangdong Province (YQ2014152)
- Key project of Guangdong province (2016WZDXM005)
- China Scholarship Council (201808440655)
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