Flattening of government hierarchies and misuse of public funds: Evidence from audit programs in China
Authors:
- Shiyu BoSBShiyu Bo
- Yiping WuYWYiping Wu
- Lingna ZhongLZLingna Zhong
- 1 November 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 179, 141-151
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- China National Natural Science Foundation (71673174, 71803064)
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (20JNTZ16)
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