CHAPTER 19 Judgment Aggregation
Authors:
- Christian ListCLChristian List
- Clemens PuppeCPClemens Puppe
- 15 January 2009
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 457-482
Abstract
The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The classical preference aggregation problem is a special case in which propositions take the form of binary preference judgments (“alternative x is better than alternative y”). The first part of the chapter focuses on aggregation methods that satisfy an Arrowian independence condition (“propositionwise aggregation”). In the independent case, the literature has produced a number of general characterization results that precisely demarcate the circumstances in which satisfactory aggregation is possible from those in which it is not Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbards oligarchy theorem are special cases of these results. The independence condition is, however, not uncontroversial and the second part of the chapter considers various relaxations of it. Judgment aggregation is still a very active field and the chapter concludes with an outlook on what we believe are important topics for future research.Keywords
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