Zero-determinant strategy in stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game
Authors:
Open Access
- 12 July 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 13 (1) , 1-11
Abstract
In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the attacker may be a boundedly rational player, who adopts a combination of the BR strategy and a fixed stubborn one. In such a condition, the SSE strategy may not maintain the defensive performance due to the stubbornness. In this paper, we focus on how the defender can adopt the unilateral-control zero-determinate (ZD) strategy to confront the boundedly rational attacker. At first, we verify the existence of ZD strategies for the defender. We then investigate the performance of the defender’s ZD strategy against a boundedly rational attacker, with a comparison of the SSE strategy. Specifically, when the attacker’s strategy is close to the BR strategy, the ZD strategy admits a bounded loss for the defender compared with the SSE strategy. Conversely, when the attacker’s strategy is close to the stubborn strategy, the ZD strategy can bring higher defensive performance for the defender than the SSE strategy does.Keywords
All Related Versions
Funding Information
- National Key Research and Development Program of China (2022YFA1004700)
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62173250)
- Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Major Project (2021SHZDZX0100)
- Royal Institute of Technology
This publication has 40 references indexed in Scilit:
- Deceptive Attack and Defense Game in Honeypot-Enabled Networks for the Internet of ThingsIEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2016
- Asymmetric Evolutionary GamesPLOS Computational Biology, 2015
- Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods GameScientific Reports, 2015
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemmaGames and Economic Behavior, 2015
- Towards a Theory of Moving Target Defense2014
- Moving-Target Defenses for Computer NetworksIEEE Security & Privacy, 2014
- Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma gamesProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2013
- Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution against Boundedly Rational FollowersLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2013
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponentProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2012
- Bounded Rationality1990