Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design: Zero-Pricing and Net Neutrality
Authors:
- 1 August 2009
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 23 (3) , 61-76
Abstract
This paper focuses on the pricing aspect of the “net neutrality” debate—in particular, the de facto ban on fees levied by Internet service providers on content providers to reach users. This “zero-price” rule may prove desirable for several reasons. Using a two-sided market analysis, we suggest that it subsidizes creativity and innovation in new content creation—goals shared by copyright and patent laws. The rule also helps to solve a coordination problem: since Internet service providers do not completely internalize the effects of their own pricing decisions, lack of regulation may lead to even higher fees charged by all. Finally, allowing for such fees runs the risk of creating horizontally differentiated Internet service providers with different libraries of accessible content, thereby foreclosing consumers and leading to Internet fragmentation.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Pricing and commitment by two-sided platformsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- Two-sided markets: a progress reportThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2006
- One-sided Logic in Two-sided MarketsReview of Network Economics, 2004
- Platform Competition in Two-Sided MarketsJournal of the European Economic Association, 2003
- Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform IndustriesReview of Network Economics, 2003
- Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service ProvidersThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2003
- Contracting with ExternalitiesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999
- Network Externality: An Uncommon TragedyJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1994
- An Economic Analysis of Copyright LawThe Journal of Legal Studies, 1989
- Standardization, Compatibility, and InnovationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1985