No cause for collapse
Open Access
- 15 July 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-19
Abstract
We investigate a hitherto under-considered avenue of response for the logical pluralist to collapse worries. In particular, we note that standard forms of the collapse arguments seem to require significant order-theoretic assumptions, namely that the collection of admissible logics for the pluralist should be closed under meets and joins. We consider some reasons for rejecting this assumption, noting some prima facie plausible constraints on the class of admissible logics which would lead a pluralist admitting those logics to resist such closure conditions.Keywords
Funding Information
- Ruhr-Universität Bochum
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