Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination*
Author:
- 1 July 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 69 (1) , 138-155
Abstract
The skeptic says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that ‘knowledge” is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”, but that both hypotheses about “knowledge” have deeply anti‐skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.Keywords
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