Abstract
De facto states exercise territorial control despite lacking international recognition. This chapter argues that they generate a distinctive and often overlooked form of nuclear insecurity. Drawing on the literature of rebel governance, functional sovereignty and ungovernance, the chapter presents a framework comprising four mechanisms. The first mechanism, governance exclusion, prevents de facto states from accessing international regulatory networks, technical assistance programmes and verification mechanisms, which are essential for maintaining the global nuclear order. The second mechanism, regulatory rupture, describes how institutional immaturity, contested territorial control and isolation from international standards can degrade the everyday administrative processes that are essential for ensuring accountability of nuclear materials. These include licensing, inventory control, and chain-of-custody documentation. The third mechanism, illicit opportunity expansion, demonstrates how fragmented policing and jurisdictional ambiguity reduce the costs of trafficking and sabotage involving nuclear and radioactive materials. The fourth mechanism, compellent threat exploitation, explains how de facto authorities may convert nuclear security risks into coercive political instruments against parent states. Together, these mechanisms produce ungovernance: a domain-specific void in which accountable authority is absent, illicit actors fill the space vacated by the parent state and the international community, and the nuclear security functions required by international frameworks systematically go unperformed. The chapter concludes by proposing a research design to operationalize and measure nuclear security ungovernance across the forty de facto states identified in the comparative literature. The composite indicator distinguishes between internal governance capacity and external regulatory embeddedness.