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Publications
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Home
Publications
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Author:
RM
Roger B. Myerson
Roger B. Myerson
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1 January 1979
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
Econometrica
Vol. 47
(1)
,
61
DOI:
10.2307/1912346
Abstract
Collective choice problems are studied from the Bayesian viewpoint. It is shown that the set of expected utility allocations which are feasible with incentive-c...
Keywords
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
BAYESIAN VIEWPOINT
BARGAINING PROBLEM
PROBLEM COLLECTIVE
COLLECTIVE CHOICE
CHOICE PROBLEMS
COMPATIBILITY
BARGAINING
COLLECTIVE
BAYESIAN
All Related Versions
Version 1, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
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