The political economy of the Korean financial crisis
Authors:
- Stephan HaggardSHStephan Haggard
- Jongryn MoJMJongryn Mo
- 1 January 2000
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 7 (2) , 197-218
Abstract
Much attention has been paid to the economics of the Asian financial crisis, but less to its politics. In this article we examine two clusters of domestic political factors that contributed to Korea’s difficulties. First, a combination of selective liberalization with close government–bank–business relations contributed to the investment boom and excessive leveraging that made the Korean economy vulnerable to external shocks. Second, we examine how politically generated uncertainty in an election year, compounded by features of the party system, resulted in a delayed response to problems in the financial sector and in dealing with the IMF. These delays, in turn, contributed to the length and depth of the crisis.Keywords
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