Purpose: This study examines whether board co-option-the appointment of directors during the incumbent CEO's tenure-is associated with future stock price crash risk. It also investigates whether CEO-director appointment ties matter beyond directors' formal independence status. Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample of U.S. firms from 1996 to 2019, the study examines the association between board co-option and subsequent crash risk. Additional analyses distinguish directors by co-option and formal independence status and account for CEO tenure, CEO and firm characteristics, and external governance. Findings: Board co-option is positively associated with the risk of future stock price crashes. Coopted non-independent directors exhibit a stronger positive association with crash risk than coopted independent directors, whereas non-co-opted independent directors are associated with lower crash risk. The association between board co-option and crash risk persists after accounting for CEO tenure, additional CEO and firm characteristics, dedicated institutional ownership, and the market for corporate control. Originality/value: Building on evidence that appointment-based executive-director coalitions predict crash risk in Chinese firms, this study isolates co-option within U.S. boards. Both co-opted independent and co-opted non-independent directors are associated with greater future crash risk, with the latter showing a stronger association. These findings suggest that formal independence may moderate the monitoring implications of CEO-director appointment ties without eliminating them.