Competition for talent under performance manipulation
Authors:
- Iván MarinovicIMIván Marinovic
- Paul PovelPPPaul Povel
- 1 August 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 64 (1) , 1-14
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 50 references indexed in Scilit:
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