On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design With Exit Option in a Markovian Environment
- 29 April 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 12 (2) , 701-745
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (0000)
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