Safe-Error Analysis of Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms - Short Paper-
Authors:
- 1 September 2021
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 39-44
Abstract
The NIST selection process for standardizing Post-Quantum Cryptography Mechanisms is currently running. Many papers already studied their theoretical security, but the resistance in deployed device has not been much investigated so far. In particular, fault attack is a serious threat for algorithms implemented in embedded devices. One particularly powerful technique is to use safe-error attacks. Such attacks exploit the fact that a specific fault may or may not lead to a faulty output depending on a secret value. In this paper, we investigate the resistance of various Post-Quantum candidates algorithms against such attacks.Keywords
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